Consider an oligopoly market with two identical firms. Assume each firm produces withΒ πΆ(π)=10π
C(q)=10q, and market demand curve isΒ π=50β2π
p=50β2Q.
Solve for the Cournot Nash equilibrium quantities, prices, and profits for the two firms. What is the equilibrium quantity each firm produces?γRound off to two decimal places.Β
Solution:
Derive Total Revenue (TR):
P = 50 β 2Q
Q = "q_{1} +q_{2}"
Solve for firm 1:
TR1 = P*Q
TR1 = (50 β 2("q_{1} +q_{2} )" ) q1
TR1 = 50q1 β 2q12 - 2q1q2
Derive marginal revenue:
MR1 = derivative of TR with respect to Q
"\\frac{\\partial TR_{1} }{\\partial q_{1} }"Β = 50 β 4q1 - 2q2
MR1 = 50 β 4q1 - 2q2
Compute the profit-maximizing output by setting MR = MC:
MC1 = derivative of TC1 with respect to q1
TC1 = 10q
MC1 ="\\frac{\\partial TC_{1} }{\\partial q_{1} }"Β = 10
MR1 = MC1
50 β 4q1 - 2q2 = 10
50 - 10 - 2q2 = 4q1
40 - 2q2 = 4q1
q1 = 10 - 0.5q2
Solve for firm 2:
TR2 = P*Q
TR2 = (50 β 2("q_{1} +q_{2} )" ) q2
TR2 = 50q2 β 2q22 - 2q1q2
Derive marginal revenue:
MR2 = derivative of TR2 with respect to q2
"\\frac{\\partial TR_{2} }{\\partial q_{2} }"Β = 50 β 4q2 - 2q1
MR2 = 50 β 4q2 - 2q1
Compute the profit-maximizing output by setting MR2 = MC2:
MC2 = derivative of TC2 with respect to q2
TC2 = 10q
MC2 ="\\frac{\\partial TC_{2} }{\\partial q_{2} }"Β = 10
MR2 = MC2
50 β 4q2 - 2q1 = 10
50 - 10 - 2q1 = 4q2
40 - 2q1 = 4q2
q2 = 10 - 0.5q1
Substitute firm 1 into the reaction function of firm 2
q1 = 10 - 0.5q2
q1 = 10 - 0.5(10 - 0.5q1)
q1 = 10 - 5 + 0.25q1
q1 - 0.25q1 = 5
0.75q1 = 5
q1 = "\\frac{5}{0.75} = 6.67"
q2 = 10 - 0.5q1
q2 = 10 - 0.5(6.67)
q2 = 6.67
Each firm produces an equilibrium quantity of 6.67
Substitute to derive equilibrium price:
P = 50 - 2Q
P = 50 - 2 (q1 + q2)
P = 50 - 2(6.67 + 6.67)
P = 50 - 26.68
P = 23.32
The market equilibrium price is 23.32
Profit for each firm:
Profit = TR - TC
= "(P\\times Q) - TC"
= "(23.32\\times 6.67) - 10"
= "155.54 - 10 = 145.54"
Profit = 145.54
Each firm will have a profit of 145.54
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