Develop an attack tree to board a train without paying.
Attack Trees could be used to analyze problems in many different domains
including but not limited to Oil/gas pipelines, Chemical Plants, Information Technology,
Infrastructure, and Facilities. However, applying Attack Trees to analyze problems we
are familiar with may be overkill. For instance, attacks which happen frequently (such as
house break-ins) are well understood and intuitive.
Attack Trees are typically applied for architecture risk analysis and hence may
describe attacks for specific protocols that appear in the architecture. That level of detail
is not necessary for requirements engineering. An Attack Tree for requirements
engineering might start with the risks identified during a preliminary risk analysis and be
refined by the analysis of the concept of operations.
While the generation of an Attack Tree can be done incrementally and be refined by
multiple contributors, there is no guarantee of completeness. Often attacker-specific
information is a best guess. An Attack Tree can be quite detailed, and that detail increases
the cost of both creation and maintenance, particularly for a large system. On the other
hand, widely applicable attacks trees could be shared and hence refined by a relatively
large collection of experts. But, it should be note that Attack Trees do not necessarily
represent all possible attacks. The unrepresented attacks may be more prevalent as we
deploy larger and more complex systems.
Comments
Leave a comment