The President was undoubtedly well aware of the Soviet Government's and Mr. Khrushchev's personal stance toward recent events and US government activities towards Cuba. For a long period of time, there had been an uninterrupted anti-Cuban campaign in the United States, one that seemed to be supported by the US government. Now the US government wanted to impose an embargo on commerce with Cuba, and there had been some discussion of organized piracy operating under the auspices of the US. All of this could only spell doom for humanity. The US Government seemed to think that Cubans must resolve their internal problems at the US's discretion, not their own. Cuba, on the other hand, belonged to Cubans, not to the United States.
The Soviet Government felt that if both parties were committed to reducing international tensions and resolving remaining international issues, such protests could only serve to exacerbate tensions and should be avoided. If worst comes to worst and war occurs, certainly 150,000 troops will be little. As the President was well aware, this is not 1812, when Napoleon depended on the sheer quantity of troops, sabres, and rifles. Neither can today's scenario be compared to 1941, when Hitler based his strategy on tank and gun numbers. Today, life and military technology had produced a completely new scenario in which it was preferable to abstain from weapons. Regarding Soviet assistance to Cuba, Mr. Gromyko stated that he had been instructed to emphasize, as the Soviet Government had already done, that such assistance was pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to Cuba's defense capabilities and development, including agricultural development and land amelioration, as well as training Cuban nationals in handli
Comments
Leave a comment