Economics Answers

Why do some analysts think shared savings are weaker incentives than bearing downside risk for failing to meet specific spending targets? Explain.

If the price of a service in a population is $30 and in next year price of the same service increases to $90 but all other factors remain same.what will be the demand care for service will be: more elastic, less elastic or no change.

19) The government is considering two ways to help the needy: giving them cash or giving them free meals at soup kitchens.
a. Give an argument, based on the standard theory of the rational consumer, for giving cash.
b. Give an argument, based on asymmetric information, for why the soup kitchen may be better than the cash handout.
c. Give an argument, based on behavioral economics, for why the soup kitchen may be better than the cash handout.
d. The own price elasticity of apples is –0.8 and the cross elasticity of apples with respect to the price of oranges is 0.5. Suppose that the price of apples rises by 10 percent and the price of oranges falls by 4 percent. What will happen to apple demand?

draw a demand and supply curve for British pounds(on vertical axis plot rand per British pound)

who would benefit and who would lose if south african government doubled the tariff on imported frozen chicken leg quarters from brazil

use examples to explain the difference between absolute advantage and comparative advantage in international trade

Tina has an income of $70,000 with a health probability of 80%. Her medical expenses during sickness are fully paid by insurance which is usually $2000. What will be the actuarially fair premium tina should pay?

if there is a linear demand curve for services, and at $50 per visit there would be 20,000 annual visits. If a politician proposes making service price free (0 price). The number of visits would rise to 55,000.
A.How much social welfare loss from moral hazard would occur
B. How much tax money must be raised to finance services if visits were made completely free?

The population has two kinds of health risks, high and low. Let the expected annual health care costs for the high risk be $5,000, and for the low risk, half that. If there are twice as many low risk as high risk individuals, and if the one insurer’s administrative load is 10%, what would the premium be if everyone is compelled to and able to buy health insurance?

Calculate the equilibrium of income if c=R100 million / 0.8 Y and i = R125 million.