Question #37193

Matrix Games:

If we are given an arbitrary I by J matrix A, there exists a greater than 0 so that the matrix B with entries Bij = Aij + a has only positive entries. Show that any optimal randomized probability vectors for the game with pay-off matrix B are also optimal for the game with pay-off matrix A.

Expert's answer

Answer on Question#37193 - Math - Other

If we are given an arbitrary I×JI \times J matrix AA, there exists a>0a > 0 so that the matrix BB with entries Bij=Aij+aB_{ij} = A_{ij} + a has only positive entries. Show that any optimal randomized probability vectors for the game with pay-off matrix BB are also optimal for the game with pay-off matrix AA.

Solution:

Suppose that vectors


x=(x1;x2;;xI),y=(y1;y2;;yJ),\overline{x} = (x_1; x_2; \ldots; x_I), \quad \overline{y} = (y_1; y_2; \ldots; y_J),


are optimal randomized probability ones for the game with pay-off matrix BB. Thus (by the definition of an optimal randomized probability vector)


i=1Ixi=1,j=1Jyj=1.\sum_{i=1}^{I} x_i = 1, \quad \sum_{j=1}^{J} y_j = 1.


If vectors x,y\overline{x}, \overline{y} are optimal randomized probability ones then


vB=vBβ=minymaxxi=1Ij=1JBijxiyj=maxxminyi=1Ij=1JBijxiyj=vBαv_B = v_B^\beta = \min_{\overline{y}} \max_{\overline{x}} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} B_{ij} x_i y_j = \max_{\overline{x}} \min_{\overline{y}} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} B_{ij} x_i y_j = v_B^\alpha


where vBv_B is a value of the game with pay-off matrix BB.

Thus we have


vAβ=minymaxxi=1Ij=1JAijxiyj=minymaxxi=1Ij=1J(Bija)xiyj=minymaxxi=1Ij=1JBijxiyjminymaxxi=1Ij=1Jaxiyj=vBaminymaxxi=1Ij=1Jxiyj=vBaminymaxxi=1Ixij=1Jyj==vBaminymaxx(11)=vBa.\begin{aligned} v_A^\beta &= \min_{\overline{y}} \max_{\overline{x}} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} A_{ij} x_i y_j = \min_{\overline{y}} \max_{\overline{x}} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} (B_{ij} - a) x_i y_j = \min_{\overline{y}} \max_{\overline{x}} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} B_{ij} x_i y_j - \\ &- \min_{\overline{y}} \max_{\overline{x}} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} a x_i y_j = v_B - a \min_{\overline{y}} \max_{\overline{x}} \sum_{i=1}^{I} \sum_{j=1}^{J} x_i y_j = v_B - a \min_{\overline{y}} \max_{\overline{x}} \sum_{i=1}^{I} x_i \sum_{j=1}^{J} y_j = \\ &= v_B - a \min_{\overline{y}} \max_{\overline{x}} (1 \cdot 1) = v_B - a. \end{aligned}


By analogy


vAα=vBa.v_A^\alpha = v_B - a.


Because


vAβ=vBa=vAαv_A^\beta = v_B - a = v_A^\alpha


thus the game with pay-off matrix AA has the value


vA=vBav_A = v_B - a


and vectors


x=(x1;x2;;xI),y=(y1;y2;;yJ),\overline{x} = (x_1; x_2; \ldots; x_I), \quad \overline{y} = (y_1; y_2; \ldots; y_J),


are optimal randomized probability ones for the game with pay-off matrix AA.

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