Other Economics Answers

How to interpret regression results?

What is residual square?

How to tell (know) if an explanatory variable has impact or not and how much?

Consider a monopoly platform serving two distinct groups of users. Each group i = a; b

comprises a unit mass of users who interact on the platform. The platform charges (possibly different) membership fees for the two groups, Ma and Mb. The constant marginal

cost of attracting users on the platform is normalized to zero. A user of group i enjoys

the following net utility when interacting on the platform with users of the other group:

Ui = ui + γinj - Mi; where ui is the intrinsic value of being on the platform, i measures

the indirect network effect provided by an additional member of side j on each member

of side i, nj is the number of members of side j on the platform. We assume that ui is

drawn from a uniform distribution on [0; vi]. As for indirect network effects, we assume

that they are positive on both sides (γa; γb > 0).

a) Derive the number of participating users on side i as a function of the number of

participating users on the other side.

Consider two firms, A and B, that are deciding simultaneously which of two standards,

X and Y, to adopt.

a) Provide a game-table with pay-offs for the two firms that represents the siutation of

a standard war. That is write down the matrix and provide numbers for the pay-offs.

Then solve the game for its Nash Equilibria,

b) Do the same as in part a) for a situation that corresponds to a coordination game

where both firms prefer to have the same standard but both firms prefer standard

Y.

Consider the market for a single network good and suppose that consumers differ in their

valuation of both the stand-alone and the network benefits (it can indeed be argued that

it is more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the stand-alone component

of a technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network.) To capture this

idea, write the consumers’ utility function for joining the network as U(θ) = θ(a + νne),

where a is the stand-alone benefit, ν > 0 measures the network effect, ne is the expected

number of users joining the network, and θ is uniformly distributed on the unit interval

(i.e. between zero and one).

a) Identify the indifferent consumer for a given price p and a given expected network

size ne.

b) Express the willingness to pay for the nth unit of the good when ne units are

expected to be sold.

Provide a short written assessment of the following statements. Evaluate the veracity of

the statement. Provide a single argument in up to three sentences for each statement

a) Privacy regulation { that exceeds informing the consumer about how her data is

used { is not necessary and not efficient.

b) A platform operator running a two-sided market can find it optimal to set prices

below zero for one side of the market.

c) The size of a network depends on how consumers form expectation on the choices

of other consumers.

d) When advertising has a negative externality on consumers in a two-sided market

context, a monopoly platform operator should increase the prices to advertisers

compared to the case of no-externality. Thus the platform operator makes larger

profits with negative ad externalities.

Perfect competition is an industry with:

Define the term market and marketing. “Most of the livestock products are perishable in nature and need urgent marketing” so what types of marketing strategies should be made to increase profit? Explain the problems facing by Nepalese livestock and livestock product marketing.

Kunene (2008) defines the entrepreneurial process as the pursuit of market opportunities to develop new/future innovative goods and services which should be discovered, evaluated and exploited to extract social and economic value from the environment, leading ultimately to new independent business/venture. Which of the following best describes the above?