1) Suppose that the demand function of an industry can be described by Q(P) = 1500-
3P. Assume there are two firms with cost function C(g) = 20g.
(a) Determine the equilibrium outcome and profits when firms set quantities sequentially
as in the Stackelberg model. Assume that firm 1 is the leader.
(b) Assume firm 1 is the incumbent in a monopoly market and firm 2 a potential entrant.
Entry implies a fixed cost of F = 300. Can entry be deterred? Will the incumbent firm deter
entry?
(c) Suppose entry implies a fixed cost of F = 30000. Will the incumbent firm deter
entry?
(d) What would firm 1 do if there were no threat of entry? What does this mean for the
incumbent's strategy in part (C)?
"p=500-\\frac{1}{3}Q"
"TR=500Q-\\frac{1}{3}Q^2"
"MR=500-\\frac{2}{3}Q"
"MC=20"
"500-\\frac{2}{3}Q=20"
"Q=720"
"p=260"
"Profit=182,000"
If F=300
if F-30000
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