a)
b) We use the backward induction method to solve this problem.
Therefore, the rival gets to choose whether he wants to clone the new product or not. If he clones it he gets a pay-off of $20 million and $0 million if he does not clone. So he will choose to clone the new product as he gets a higher a pay-off.
Now given that the Rival chooses to clone it in case you introduce a new product, you would prefer to not introduce the product as it gives you a higher pay-off.
Hence, the Nash Equilibrium would be, Not Introduce a New Product. ($10, $10)
c) Yes, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium. The rival choosing to clone or not clone the product based on pay-off is the subgame. Here, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the rival choosing to clone the product and the equilibrium is (-$5, $20)
d) In the end, you will choose not to introduce the product and each gets a pay-off of $10 million.
Because if you have chosen to introduce the product and rival would clone the product you would have got -$5 million, but you are better off not introducing the product at all
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