Answer to Question #227249 in Macroeconomics for jaga

Question

Consider the following voting game. There are three players, 1, 2 and 3. And there are three alternatives: A, B and C. Players vote simultaneously for an alternative. Abstaining is not allowed. Thus, the strategy space for each player is {A, B, C}. The alternative with the most votes wins. If no alternative receives a majority, then alternative A is selected. Denote ui(d) the utility obtained by player i if alternave d � {A, B, C} is selected. The payoff functions are,

u1 (A) = u2 (B) = u3 (C) = 2

u1 (B) = u2 (C) = u3 (A) = 1

u1 (C) = u2 (A) = u3 (B) = 0

a. Let us denote by (i, j, k) a profile of pure strategies where player 1’s strategy is (to vote for) i, player 2’s strategy is j and player 3’s strategy is k. Show that the pure strategy profiles (A,A,A) and (A,B,A) are both Nash equilibria.

b. Is (A,A,B) a Nash equilibrium? Comment.

Answer 1

The answer to your question is provided in the image: